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3Pension plans and
retirement incentives
Richard  Disney  and Edward  Whitehouse
The well-documented  decline  in the labour-force  participation  of older  women  and older  men (in
particular)  is common  to most industrialised  countries. The proportion  of men aged  55 to 64 in
employment  fell between  1980  and 1996  in all 17 OECD countries  for which  data are available,
by an average  of more than ten percentage  points. The average  employment  rate  of men in this
age group  in 1996  was a little  under  60  per cent.'
The reasons  for this are complex,  but probably  involve  both a demand  effect  - high and
persistent  unemployment,  especially  in Europe - and a supply  effect  - pension  benefits  and
the value  of other savings  have increased. Many governments  are worried  about the decline  in
labour-force  participation  of older  workers. Of 28 countries  responding  to the OECD's Ca?jg
World  questionnaire,  15  mentioned  low  effective  retirement  ages  and poor work  incentives  in the
pension  system  as a matter  of policy  concem.2
The population  of most countries is ageing due to  a mix of declining  fertility  and
increasing  longevity. It is desirable  to encourage  people to retire later to counterbalance  the
effect  of ageing  on the ratio  of workers  to dependants. Some,  such as Chand  and  Jaeger  (1996),
have argued  that this can be achieved  with 'parametric  reforms',  tinkening  with the rules of
existing  defined-benefit  schemes. Many  countries,  however,  have introduced  or proposed  more
radical  reforms  emphasising  the role of privately  managed  defined-contribution  pensions. An
obvious  question  is how  these  regimes  are  likely  to effect  retirement  behaviour.
We begin by modelling  a simple retirement  saving plan and looking  at the optimal
retirement  date. This simple  plan  looks very  sirnilar  to a defined-contribution  scheme. Optimal
retirement  depends'  on prospective  earnings  and the evolution  of the accumulated  fund, which,  in
principle,  are separable. We then move on to defined-benefit  pension  schemes,  which  are the
norm in public and much private provision.  Here there are significant  interactions  and
complications.  The pension  formula  is often non-linear,  with accrual  rates  that vary with the
number  of years  of contributions  and formulae  that depend on a lirnited  number of 'best' or
'final'  years  of earnings. There are also 'spikes' when early  retirement  is first permitted,  at the
I  OECD  (1998b).
2  These  were  Belgium,  the Czech  Republic,  Denmark,  Finland,  Germany,  Greece,  Hungary,  Italy,
Korea,  the Netherlands,  New  Zealand,  Norway,  Poland,  the Slovak  Republic,  Spain  and  Turkey.  Kalisch
and  Aman  (1998),  Table  13.
4standard  retirement  age  etc.  Pensions  can be actuarially  adjusted,  depending  on the year  at which
benefits are first drawn.  We show that the incentives  in a defined-benefit  scheme are very
different  from the defined-contribution  retirement  saving  plan.
Most of  the existing literature on  retirement focuses on  public-sector defined-benefit
schemes.'  Another strand looks at the effect of private defined-benefit  schemes,  commonly
provided by employers.4  Defined-contribution  schemes,  however,  are playing  a bigger  part in
pension systems through out  the  world.  In  the  United States, employer-based  defined-
contribution  plans, known as 401(k)s,  have tended to substitute  for traditional  defined-benefit
schemes. 5 The trend to defined contribution  among  employer  plans  is less pronounced  in the
United  Kingdom,  but many  employers  expect to change  their provision  in this direction  in the
future.6 Most of the growth of defined-contribution  plans has been in individual  pension
accounts, known as personal pensions, which have mainly substituted  for the public-sector,
defined-benefit  scheme. They now cover more than a quarter  of employees. In addition,  the
new stakeholder  pensions,  announced in November 1998,  will be group defined-contribution
plans. 7 In the new pension  systems  of Latin  America  and Eastern Europe,  defined-contribution
schemes  are also a substitute  for the public  plan. Australia,  Italy  and Sweden  have  also increased
the emphasis  on privately  managed  defined-contribution  schemes. 8
Since all these schemes are recent, few people have retired with substantial  defined-
contribution  pensions,  so it is not surprising  that the issue  of retirement  incentives  in these  plans
has not yet been  addressed.
The object of this paper is to  examnine  the impact of type of pension scheme on
retirement  behaviour. Trends in labour-force  participation  of older workers  and demand-side
issues  are addressed  in a sister  paper (Disney  and Whitehouse,  1999a).
The structure  of the current  paper is as follows. The following  section  describes  a simple,
theoretical  model of optimal retirement. Section  2 introduces  an empirical  model of a simple
retirement-savings  plan,  or defined-contribution  pension  scheme. Section  3 compares  this with a
defined-benefit  scheme. Sections  4 and 5 examine  the effect of these pension plans on work
incentives.  The following  three sections  extend  the basic  model  to introduce  'real-world'  features
of pension  plans. Section  9 concludes,  examines  the policy  implications  of our results  and sets
out an agenda  for future  research  in this area.
Recent  intemational  comparative  studies  include  one of 11 OECD  countnres  coordinated  by
Gruber  and  Wise  (1997,  1999).  Bl6ndal  and  Scarpetta  (1998)  analyse  a panel  of 15  OECD countries,  and
draw  on rmicroeconometric  studies  of five  countries  commissioned  by  the  OECD. Other  notable  studies
include  Boskin  and  Hurd  (1978),  Burtless  (1996),  Hurd  and  Boskin  (1984),  Mitchell  and  Fields  (1984) on
the  United  States,  and  Meghir  and  Whitehouse  (1997)  on the United  Kingdom.
4  Examples  include  Kotlikoff  and  Wise  (1987),  Lumsdaine,  Stock  and  Wise  (1990,  1994)  on the
United  States;  Disney,  Meghir  and  Whitehouse  (1994)  on the  United  Kingdom;  Palme  and  Svenson  (1997)
on  Sweden;  and  Seike  (1989,  1997)  on Japan.
5  See  Gustman  and  Steinmeier  (1992),  Ippolito  (1995),  and  Kruse  (1995)  on the growth  of defined-
contribution  schemes  and  the reasons  for  this  trend.
6  Disney  (1995).
7  Department  of Social  Security  (1998).  See  also  Disney,  Emmerson  and  Tanner  (1999).
8  See Queisser  (1998)  on Latin  America,  Palacios  and Rocha (1998)  on Hungary,  Gora and
Rutkowski  (1998)  on Poland,  Flanagan  (1999)  on  Australia  and  Tumbarello  (1999)  on Italy.
51.  A model of optimal  retirement
Retirement  is often  perceived  as an 'institutional'  decision. Nevertheless,  the decline  in
labour-force  participation  of  55-64 year olds, usually  below the  standard pensionable  age,
suggests  at least  some  element  of individual  choice  in the retirement  process. The basic  labour-
supply  model,  with  individuals  mnaxirnising  utility  (defined  over leisure  and consumption)  subject
to a budget  constraint  can be extended  to explore  retirement. In this model,  consumption  is
financed  from income,  which in tum comprises  both earnings  and the return on accumulated
assets. In a lifetime  model,  we can also  include  the desire  to bequeath  some  of the accumulated
assets.
However,  this basic modeL  does not in itself provide  a rationale  for retirement  as we
know  it. If underlying  wages  and the utility  of leisure  are constant over the lifetime,  there is no
necessary  reason  for someone  to work  continuously  until a particular  age and  then leave  work  for
the rest of their life. The optimum  would  probably  be reduced,  but continuous,  employrnent
throughout  the lifetime.  We need  further  structural  assumptions  to identify  an econormic  motive
for retirement.
A straightforward  explanation  of retirement  relies  on systematic  changes  with age either
in wages  (assumed  to reflect  age-related  changes  in productivity)  or in the utility  of leisure  or
both. 9 Figure  1 illustrates  this story. Wages  are assumed  to follow  an inverted-U  pattern (see  the
discussion  in section 8.2.2  below) and the marginal  value of leisure  to rise with age.  In this
model,  individuals  will  work  until  the age,  R, when the curves  cross. R is a unique  point. Note
also that R is not the point at which  either  wages  or the rnarginal  utility  of leisure  are at their
maximum.






Note too the importance  of the assumption  that changes  in the marginal  product and
utility  of leisure  are smooth,  continuous  and are characterised  by simple  functional  forms.  In
more complex  models  there may  be local  equilibria,  emphasising  the need  not for a static  model
but a cynx7dc  model  of the retirement  decision. In particular,  non-linearities  may  arise  because
9  See  Lazear  (1986)  and Disney  (1996),  pp. 201-203.
6pension plans contain complex accrual structures. In this case, the individual should appraise the
prospective gain in net utility (leisure  less access  to extra consumption) from retiring now relative
to any point in the future. This is a more complex problem to analyse'° but intrinsically  evaluates
the  continued  'return to  working' at  all points  in  time.  To  show  how  pension  schemes
differentially affect this return to  continued working, the  next sections examine a number of
stylised  cases.
2.  A simple retirement savings plan
We first consider a mandatory defined-contribution plan with a 10 per cent contribution
rate.  We assume the pension  earns an  investment return of  5 per  cent  a year.  When the
individual retires, he or she converts the fund to an annuity.  We calculate the annuity rate using
the 'riskless' interest rate, which we assume initially  to be 2 per cent.
To  calculate pension  benefits,  we  need  the  individual's lifetime  earnings  (and  so
contribution) profile. Initially, we assume a simple linear growth in earnings of 3 per cent a year
and that the individual  contributes from age 20.'1
Figure 2 shows the assumed earnings profile and  the model's calculations of pension
benefits.  Figure 3 shows the gross replacement rate: the ratio of the annual pension to (current)
earnings.  The replacement rate at age 50 is very small: around  12 per  cent.  However, the
pension grows rapidly, at around  12 per cent a year.  The two lines move closer together in
Figure 2, and the replacement rate in Figure 3 rises quickly.
Each extra year of work adds to the accrued pension in three ways. First, an extra year's
contributions are made.  Secondly,  the accumulated fund earns an additional year's investment
returns, assumed to be 5 per cent.  Thirdly, the year's delay in annuitising the pension means that
the benefit increases in line with annuity rates.  Figure 4 shows these annuity rates, calculated
using mortality data from Thailand.1 2 These are actuarial, not market annuity rates." 3 We have so
far modelled pension benefits only for men since they are most affected by early retirement.
ID  Stock  and Wise  (1990,  1991).
1l  The impact  of more  complex  earnings  profiles  is examined  below.
12  The annuity rate is the inverse of the discounted present value of the product of one rminus  the
mortality rate.
13  Market rates will tend to be lower, because of administrative charges and adverse selection.  See
Piggott and Doyle (1999), Friedman and Warshawsky (1988, 1990), Brugiavini (1993) and Dilnot  et at
(1994), pp. 148-151 for a discussion.
7Figure 2.  Earnings and defined-contribution pension by age
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Figure 3.  Gross replacement rate by age, defined-contribution plan
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83.  A simple  defined-benefit  plan
The  initial defined-benefit  scheme  is based  on  average lifetime earnings." 4 Early  vears'
earnings  are  uprated  in  line  with  prices.  To  allow  direct,  fair  comparisons  of  retirement
incentives  between  the defined-benefit  and  defined-contribution  plans we equalise  the  resulting
pension  value at  age 65.  This gives an  accrual rate of  1.7 per  cent  in the  basic defined-benefit
scheme.  Again,  for  equivalence  with  the  defined-contribution  plan,  we assume  a  10 per  cent
contribution  rate to this plan.';
Figure 5 shows  the pension  value by age (vhich  is comparable  to Figure 2).  The defined
benefit  pension  is  much  flatter  across  the  lifecycle  than  the  defined  contributon  scheme,
increasing by around  5 per  cent a vear compared  with  12 per cent in the latter.  Each  additional
year of work  increases the pension  in txvo ways.  First,  an extra vear's contribution  adds to  the
number  of vears in the  defined-benefit  formula.  Secondly, the  base  for  the  defined  benefit  is
increasing.  Since we assume that  real earnings grow  continuously  by 3 per cent  a year, average
lifetime earnings are about  11/2 per cent higher after each extra year of work.
Figure 6 compares  the gross replacement  rate in the  tWo  baselne  plans.  As noted  above,
we  have  ensured  that  the pensions  are equally generous  at age 65,  so differences  between  the
curves  reflect  only  intrinsic  structural  variation  bet-ween the  two  types  of  plan.  The  curves
thercfore  intersect  at  age  65.  The  defined-benefit  plan  gives  a  much  larger  prospective
replacement  rate  at early ages and  is relatively flat.  The  defined-contribution  pension  increases
close to exponentially  with age.
Figure  5 Earnings  and  defined-benefit  pension  by  age
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14  Schemes  based on fewer  vears of earnings (e.g.  final)  are discussed  below.
l;  This essentiall1 assumes that the real return on individuals'  contributions to the defined-benefit
plan is equal to the funded defined contribution plan. But revenues to the defined benefit scheme are the
total wage bill multiplied by the contribution rate.  If real returns exceed wage-bill  growth, there xvill  tend
to be a deficit in the defined-benefit plan that must be financed from general revenues.
9Figure  6. Gross  replacement  rate  by  pension  type  and  age
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4.  The effect of the pension system on the return  to working
The  gross  replacement  rates  in Figure  5 give  some  indication  of  retirement  incentives.  In
a static  framework,  we  would  expect  to  see  fewer  people  working  the  higher  the  replacement  rate,
both  because  of  a  substitution  effect  and  an  income  effect  (the  higher  the  replacement  rate,  ce/ens
pan bus, the  higher  is lifetime  income).
However,  this  ignores  the  dynamic  nature  of  the  retirement  problem  because  it  fails  to
capture  all  of  the  financial  returns  to  continued  work  versus  retirement.  Working  an  additional
year  not  only  brings  in earnings,  but  will  also  alter  the  value  of  the  pension.  The  pension  system
can  be  thought  of  as  an  implicit  tax  or  subsidy  to  continued  working.  Therefore,  the  change  in
pension  wealth  needs  to  be  added  to  earnings  to  show  the  true,  total  reward  for working."6
As  noted  above,  working  an  additional  year  increases  a  defined-contribution  pension  in
three  different  ways.  We  can  ignore  the  contributions  made  in  the  year  in  question  when
measuring  the  reward  to  work,  because  they  will be  converted  into  an  annuity  next  year.  This  is
not  the  case  in the  defined-benefit  plan,  where  contributions  are  not  directly  related  to  benefits.
However,  the  other  two  sources  of  increased  pension  value  - the  additional  year's  investment
returns  and  the  higher  annuity  rate  from  delaying  annuitisation  for  a vear  - do  increase  pension
wealth.  However,  the  higher  annuity  rate  in  a year's  time  partly  reflects  the  risk  of  dying  within
the  year.  This  mortality  risk  (slightly)  reduces  the  value  of  continuing  work  and  deferring  the
pension,  reflecting  the  odds  of dying  before  receiving  any  pension. 7
4.1  The  effect  of a defined-contribution  plan  on  the return  to  working
Figure  6 shows  how  the  change  in pension  wealth  vanres with  age and,  through  the  profile
of  earnings  plus  change  in pension  wealth,  the  impact  on  the  return  to working.  At  younger  ages,
the  rate  of  growth  of  pension  wealth  is only  slightly  increasing  or  flat,  because  the  value  of  the
fund  increases  with  each  extra  year's  contributions.  But  at  older  ages,  this  is  overtaken  by  the
mortality  risk  (again,  taken  from  the  Thai  data),  and  delaving  retirement  a  year  then  reduces
Lazear (1986).
This effect  was not  included  in Figure  5.  See Gruber  and  \W'ise  (1997. 1999) for a discussion  of
this issue.
10pension  wealth.  The top line of the Figure  shows the total reward  to  continued  working: wages
plus the increment  to pension  wealth.
Figure 7.  Earnings and change in pension wealth by age,
defined-contribution plan
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4.2  The effect  of a defined-benefit  plan  on  the return  to working
Figure 7 gives a similar picture  for the stylised defined-benefit  pension.  Pension  wealth
increases from  an  extra  year's work  through  the  additional  year  in  the  defined-benefit  formula
and  through  the  increase  in  the  earnings  base  (since  real pay  is  assumed  to  grow  each  year).
Working  in  the  opposite  direction,  deferring  drawing  the  benefit  reduces  pension  wealth.
Delaying the  pension  by one  year  also  incurs  mortalitv  risk over  the  year, increasing  the  odds  that
the  person  might  die  without  drawing  any  benefits.  Finally,  contributions  are  neutral  in  the
defined-contribution  scheme  because  the  pension  value  equals  contributions  plus  their  associated
investment  return.  In  the  defined-benefit  plan,  the  pension  benefit  earned  from  a  year's
contributions  can  be  greater  or  less  than  the  value  of  the  contributions  paid  (but  is never  equal).
We  therefore  need  to deduct  contributions  from  the  change  in pension  wealth  and  from  earnings,
to give  the  net  return  to  working.  These  are  the  lower  lines of  each  pair in Figure  7.
11Figure  7. Earnings  and change  in pension  wealth by age,
defined-benefit  plan
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4.3  Defined-benefit  and defined-contribution plans  compared
Figure 8 shows the change in pension wealth alone for the two types of scheme.  The
difference in the pattern between the two plans is much clearer in this Figure.  The change in
pension wealth is broadly liriear and downward sloping for the defined-benefit scheme" 8, while
the defined-contribution scheme is at first flat and then falls exponentially. This again implies a
very different pattern of retirement incentives  in the two plans.
Figure 8. Change  in pension  wealth by age  and type of plan
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Other  studies,  such  as Kotlikoff  and W ise (1985, 1989), havc similar findings.
125.  Measuring  work incentives
We use  two  simple measures  of work incentives:  the replacement  rate  and  the  effective
tax  rate.  Static  studies,  such  as  the  OECD  analvsis  of  tax  and  benefit  systems  and  work
incentives  for  prime-age  workers  (OECD,  1996a,  1997a), often  use  measures  of  replacement
rates.  We can adjust the static, gross replacement  rates  shown  in Figure 5 to take account  of the
effects  of  working  on  pension  contributions  and  the  pension  value.  The  replacement  rate
becomes:
pension/(gross earnings + change in pension wealth)
Figure 9 shows the results for the trvo different  plan  types.  The pattern  is similar to Figure 5, but
the  results  are more  pronounced.  The  replacement  rate  of  the  defined-benefit  plan  increases
more  rapid:lv when  account  is taken  of the  fall in pension  wealth  and  contributions  which  (it is
assumed) continue  to be levied.
Figure  9. Adjusted  replacement  rate by age and type of plan
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5.1  Effective  tax rates
A  second  measure  of work  incentives  is the  effective  tax  rate.  This  was  used  in  the
international  study,  led  by  Gruber  and  Wise  (1997,  1999),  of  the  impact  of  social  security
programmes  on  retirement  behaviour.  In  the  simplest  cases,  this  measure  is the  same  as  the
replacement  rate.'9 However,  taking account  of  the  effect  of  continued  working  on  pension
wealth, this becomes:
1  - (gross  earnings +  change in pension wealth - pension)  /gross earnings
These  effective  tax rates  are the  same as average  effective  tax rates  in a static  model.  But  when
considering  a dynamic labour-supply  problem,  such as retirement,  they are best  thought  of as the
marina/effective  tax rate on  an additional vear's work.
l')  Ignoring taxation and  changes in pension wealth, for  example, the  effective tax rate  is  I  -
(earnings-pension)/eamings,  which can be simplified to pension/earnings.  See OECD  (19 97a), .\nnex 13
for a discussion.
13Figure  10  shows  the  baseline  effective  tax  rate  results.  The  differences  in  incentives
between  the  two  different  types of  plan  are very  clear  and  are  more  pronounced  than  in  the
replacement  rate  comparisons  in  Figures  5 and  9.  Defined-benefit  schemes  give  a  substantial
incentive to retire earlier, and  the effective tax rate on continued  work from  the pension  system is
only higher in the defined-contribution  plan after age 68.  This pattern  explains whv governments
need  to  impose  minimum  earlv retirement  ages in defined-benefit  plans,  because  workers  have  a
sizeable  incentive  to  retire  at  the  earliest  possible  date.  Defined-contribution  schemes,  in
contrast,  give a large incentive to continue  working until quite advanced ages.
Figure 10. Effective  tax rate on working by age and type of plan
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6.  Extensions  to the basic  model:  taxation
Gruber  and Wise stress  the importance  of other  elements  of the  tax and  benefit  system
on  retirement  incentives.  For  instance,  progressive  personal  income  tax systems  imply a higher
average  tax  rate  on  (higher)  earnings  than  on  (lower) pensions.  Thus,  net  earnings  are lower
relative to net pensions  than  to gross pensions.
The  tax  system  can  have  a  more  complex  effect.  In  some  countries,  pensioners  are
treated  more  generously  than  workers  are.  In the  United  Kingdom,  for  example,  the  tax-free
allowance  for single pensioners  is L5,220-L5,440  (depending  on  age) or 29-34%  greater  than  for
workers.2 In addition,  the tax credit  for married  pensioners  is worth  76 per  cent  more  than  for
married  couples  of working  age.  These  allowances  apply to  all the  income  of  those  over  state
pensionable  age, including earnings.
In other  countries,  pensions  are  treated  more  generously  by  the  tax system  than  labour
income.  For  example,  in Austria, 75 per  cent of pension  annuity  income  is tax-free,  and  in the
United  States, 15 per  cent.  Canada provides  a pension  income  credit  at the basic income  tax rate
on  the first slice of annuity income.
Account  should  also be  taken  of the impact  of social security  contributions  for  benefits
other  than  pensions,  such  as disability, unemployment  insurance  et:.  Again,  these  are  usually
21)  See Dilnot et a!. (1994) and Hemming and Kai  (1981) for a discussion of the impact of this tax
treatment and a proposal for reform.
21  See  \Miitehouse (1999).
14levied  only  on  earnings  and  not  on  pension  payments,  although  some  countries,  such  as  France
and  the  Netherlands,  have  recently  moved  to broaden  the  base  for  social-security  contributions.  22
We  explore,  first,  the  effect  of  a simple  personal  income  tax  system,  with  a zero-rate  band
of  $5  000  and  a  single  rate  of  25  per  cent  thereafter.  The  pension  is  assumed  to  give  a  gross
replacement  rate  of  50  per  cent.  The  lowest  line  in  Figure  11 shows  the  net  replacement  rate  at
different  levels  of earnings.  Income  tax  is levied  on  gross  earnings  above  $5 000,  but  the  pension
at  this  earnings  level  (of  $2  500)  would  be  tax-free.  The  net  replacement  rate  peaks  at  gross
earnings  of  $10  000.  The  pension  of  50  per  cent  of  earnings  is taxed  at higher  income  levels.  At
very  high  levels  of  earnings,  the  net  replacement  rate  asvmptotes  to  the  gross.
Figure 11. The impact  of a progressive  personal  income  tax
on replacement  rates
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Moving  upwards  in Figure  11,  the  next  line  shows  a system  which  gives  a larger  allowance
($7  500)  to  the  pensioner  than  the  worker.  Now  the  net  replacement  rate  peaks  later,  and  at  a
higher  level  (60  per  cent).  Finally,  the  highest  line  in  Figure  11  adds  in  a  10  per  cent  social
security  contribution.  This  shifts  the  line  upward  at  each  point.  Now,  the  net  replacement  rate
can  exceed  65 per  cent,  compared  with  the  50  per  cent  gross  rate.
7.  Extensions  to the  basic  model:  defined-contribution  schemes
Many  countries  allow  drawdown  from  defined-contribution  scheme  rather  than  forcing
conversion  to  an  annuity. 2 3 Drawdown  potentially  allows  people  to  avoid  'timing  risk',  the  risk
that  interest  rates  are  loxv on  the  date  that  the  pension  fund  is converted.  It  also  permits  those
22  These  contributions  deliver entitlement  to these other  benefits,  but all social-security programmes
involve  a  substantial  degree  of  redistribution.  In  the  absence  of  actuariallv  calculated  individual
contribution  rates,  it  is difficult  not  to  treat  these  contributions  as  a  tax.  See  OECD  (1998a)  for  a
discussion.
2;  See Piggott  and Dodle  (1999) and  Brugiavini (1993).
15with  a short  life expectancy  to avoid  the  losses from  annuitisation,  and  either  to enjoy a  higher
pension  or leave a bequest.4
Under  drawdown,  the  fund  continues  to  earn  the  market  investment  return.  In  the
model, we assume  that this is higher than  the riskless interest  rate, which underlies the calculation
of  the  ann'ity  rate.  The  only  way  of  continuing  to  earn  the  market  return  on  accumulated
pension  in  the  basic  model  is  to  continue  in  work.  However,  if  drawdown  is  allowed,  the
individual can retire and still earn this higher return.  Figure  12 shows the impact of drawdown.
Draw  down  allows  a pension  around  50  per  cent  higher  than  mandatonr  annuitisation
(assuming the individual follows a rational  rule for taking out the funds).
Figure 12. The impact  of voluntary  annuitisation  on incentives
in defined-contribution  plans
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7.1  Retirement  rules  in defined-contribution  schemes  in practice
Table 0. Retirement  rules  in mandatory  defined-contribution  systems
Normal age  Minimum  Minimum
replacement rate  pension
Argentina  58/63  -
Bolivia  65  70
Chile  60/65  50  110
Colombia  55/60  - 110
El Salvador  55/60  70  160
Peru  65  50  110
24  Givren the  correlation  between  income  and longevity,  compulsorn  annuitisation  is regressive.  See
Kothkoff (198x) for a discussion.
168.  Extensions  to the basic model: defined-benefit  schemes
The simple, stylised defined-benefit model ignores many of the  complexities of  'real-
world' plans.  Many of these are likely  to have substantial effects on retirement incentives. We
have assumed  that  the  plan's  formula  uses lifetime average earnings, and  that  each  extra
contribution delivers additional pension benefit.  Many plans, however, have non-linear accrual
structures, with floors and/or  ceilings to contributions and/or  benefits.  This means schemes
deliver different returns for people with different levels of earnings.
Secondly,  many plans have higher accrual  factors for early  years of contributions.  As later
years deliver a lower return to working in the form of extra pension entitlement, this can be a
disincentive to  continue working.  Other  schemes have maximurn pension levels or maximurn
years of accrual in the plan. The additional pension accrual is zero above these limits, but often,
contributions continue to be levied.
Thirdly, only a limited number of years of earnings count in mots schemes, which use
either  'final' or  'best' years in the  plan.  The  effects of these rules  are extremely complex.
Assuming that earnings continue to increase (as in the basic model, see Figure 1 or 4) then plans
based on  either final or best years increase the  return to  working relative to  an average-pay
scheme. This is because the earnings base used in the pension formula is growing more quickly.
If, however, earnings decline at older ages, then the pension value falls with each year of extra
contributions in  a final earnings plan.  A best-years scheme has marginally lower returns  to
working than an average-salary  scheme.
Finally, the simple defined-benefit formula does not allow for adjustments to the pension
depending on the age at which it is drawn.  In some countries, pensions drawn at the earliest
possible age are 'actuarially' reduced.  In others,  deferring drawing the  pension  beyond  the
normal age attracts an increment to the pension value when, eventually,  it is drawn.
8.1  Non-linearities  in pension  accrual
Figure 13 shows the structure of pension accrual in two public defined-benefit plans.  A
full 46 countries' profiles are in Annex 1.  The horizontal axis shows the number of years of
contributions, the vertical, the percentage of the relevant measure of earnings secured in pension
for that year of contributions. 25
We have chosen only the countries with non-linear accrual structures, and in the Annex
ranked them from the most non-linear to the least. 26 Iran offers a very high accrual rate of 3.3
per  cent, but there is a maximum replacement rate of 100 per cent.  This means that after 30
years of contribution, there can be no further increment to the pension.  The 'spike' at 10 years
indicates that  the pension 'vests' at that point.  After nine years of contributions the pension
25  These  measures  of earnings  also  vary  significantly  between  countnres:  see Section  7.2 below. Note
that we have capped  the annual accrual  at 4 per cent to make the charts easier  to  compare.  Some
countries,  e.g.  Brazil,  have  higher  accrual  rates  over some  ranges.
26  The ranking  is based  on the coefficient  of variation  of the annual  accrual  from zero  to 45 years  of
contribution.
17entitlement  is still zero.  At  ten  years of  contributions,  the  pension  is 33  per  cent  of earnings.
The spike indicates this change. 27
Colombia's  public system, shown in the second  panel of Figure  13, is more  complex  than
Iran's.  A  replacement  rate  of 65 per  cent is given for  1 000 weeks  of  contributions.  Each  50
weeks between  1 000 and  1 200 weeks earns an increment  of 2 per  cent up  to  a maximum  of 73
per  cent of earnings.  Between  1 200 and  1 400 weeks,  the  increment  is 3 per  cent  for  each  50
weeks, to  a maximum  of 85 per  cent.  A minimum  of  1 000 weeks  contributions  is required  for
the pension.
Even  these  charts  are a major  simplification: they  ignore  'sectoral'  privileges (giving early
retirement  or  reduced  contribution  requirements  to  particular  occupations  or  industries)  and
credits granted,  for example, for periods of unemployment,  disability, education  or child-rearing.
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8.  1.1  Effect  on  uork  inceti
T'he pension  system acts as a disincentive to  work  at older  ages, even  below the  normal
pension  age, in all the -countries shown  in the Annex.  For  examnple,  in  12 countries  the  accrual
rate is zero  after 40 years' or fewer of contributions  (at an average of 34 years).  In 40 countries,
later years of contribution  attract  a lower rate than  early years.
27  A  'legal-contract' approach  (see Bulow, 1982 for  an  application to  private  defined-benefit
schemes in the United States)  would show a zero accrual for the first ni'ne  years, and a 33 per cent accrual
in the tenth year.  This is also called the 'accumulated benefit obligation' (Bodie, 1991). The altemative,
used here, is to show the accrual in the first ten years assumi'ng  that the individual  will make ten years of
contributions (See,  for example, Kotlikoff and Wise, 1985  on the Uniited States).  A final approach is to
compute the probability at any point before ten years that the individual  will contribute for ten years, also
called the 'projected benefit obligation'. This method is discussed in Disney and Wh~itehouse  (1996) and
compared with the other two measures for private defined-benefit schemes in the United Kingdom.  See
also Disney (1996),  pp. 116-12  1.
1  88.2  Final, average and best salary schemes
Tables 1 and 2 show the formulae used in 80 different countries' public, defined-benefit
plans.  The Tables rank countries with final and best salary formulae inversely: from the longest
to the shortest averaging  periods.
OECD  countries, shown in Table 1, divide evenly between the three different groups.
First, those that average earnings across all or most of the working life. Secondly,  those that take
a measure of earnings in the final few years of the working life and, thirdly, those that use a
number of' 'best' years.
Table 1. Earnings  measure  in public, defined-benefit  plans:  OECD countries
Average  Best  Final
Belgium  Norway  (20)  Czech  Republic  (average  since 1985)
Germany  Austria  (15)  Portugal  (best  10 of 15)
United  Kingdom  Sweden  (15)  Turkey  (5-7)
United  States  (ex  worst  5 years)  France  (11)  Greece (5)
Canada  (ex 15%  worse  years)  Mexico  (5)
Hungary  (best  4 of 5)
Source:  Department  of Health  and  Human  Services  (1997)
In other countries, listed in Table 2, final salary schemes dominate.  Only 14 per cent of
countries use average pay and 18 per cent use a measure of best earnings.  Schemes outside the
OECD  also tend to  consider rather fewer years' earnings.  In final pay plans, the average in
OECD countries is around 7 years, compared with fewer than 4 years in lower-income countries.
There is also rather less variation among OECD countries.  Outside the OECD, three countnres
use only the final month's  pay in the pension formula, while six countries average over the last
ten years.  In best earnings schemes, the OECD  average is a 15-year formula, compared with 6
years outside the OECD.
There are two main reasons for adopting short averaging  periods in defined-benefit plans.
First, they are a simple  way to correct the effects of high and volatile inflation. Secondly,  they are
administratively  simpler than tracking work and contribution records right across the working
life.
However, they can lead to  high costs, strategic manipulation of  earnings profiles and
disproportionately higher benefits going to  higher-income workers, because they tend to  have
more steeply rising age-earnings  profiles (see below and World Bank, 1994,  Box 4.8).
19Table 2.  Earnings measure used in public, defined-benefit plans:
non-OECD countries
Average  Final  Final cont.
Albania  Argentina (10)  Niger (best of 3 or 5)
C6te d'lvoire  Colombia (10)  Rwanda (best of 3 or 5)
Congo (Kinshasa)  El Salvador (10)  Tunisia (best of 3 or 5)
Cyprus  Haiti (10)  Dominica (best 3 of final 10)
Jamaica  Madagascar (10)  Malta (best cons. of 10)
Liberia  Uruguay (10)  Dominican Republic (2)
Mauritius  Guatemala (5)  Egypt (2)
Philippines  Mali (5)  Iran (2)
Trinidad and Tobago  Romania (best cons. 5 of 10)  Jordan (2)
Cuba (best 5 of 10)  Oman (2)
Best  Slovakia (best 5 of 10)  Saudi Arabia (2)
Poland (6 of final 15)  Nicaragua (3,4,5)  Costa Rica (best 2 of 5)
Croatia (cons. 10)  Peru (3,4,5)  Syria (best of 2 or best cons. 5 in 10)
Serbia (cons. 10)  Brazil (3)  Georgia (best of 1 or 5)
Slovenia  (cons. 10)  Ethiopia (3)  Moldova (1)
Panama (7)  Iraq (3)  Pakistan (1)
Belarus (cons. 5 of final 15)  Libya (3)  Kuwait (final month)
Kyrgyzstan (cons. 5 of 15)  Paraguay (3)  . Lebanon (final month)
Turkmenistan (cons. 5 of 15)  Cameroon (best of 3 or 5)  Nigeria (final month)
Russia (cons. 5 or final 2)  Central African R. (best of 3 or 5)
Ukraine (cons. 5 or final 2)  Congo-Brazzaville (best of 3 or 5)
Ecuador (5)  Gabon (best of 3 or 5)
Bulgaria (cons. 3 of final 15)  Mauritania (best of 3 or 5)
-Algeria (3)  Morocco (best of 3 or 5)
Note:  cons. = consecutive
Source: Department of Health and Human Services (1997)
8.2.1  The anpaa offial  saIry schenw on  tork  incr
Our  baseline model  assumes that  earnings  grow  linearly with  age.  Final  pay, under  this
assumption,  is higher  than  average  pay,  and  is  growing  more  quickly.  Figure  14  shows  the
pattern  of work  incentives  by  age for  a  final- and  an average-salary plan  using  the  measure  of
replacement  rates, adjusted for changes in pension wealth.
To equalise the pension  value at age 65, the accrual rate is around  1 per  cent of final-pay
in that  scheme, compared  with  1.7 per  cent of average earnings.  The differences  in the  incentive
structure  are not  large.  But the  fact that  final pay increases more  rapidly with  age than  average
earnings  reduces  adjusted  replacement  rates  when  younger  and  increases  them  when  older. 28
This result depends  critically on the structure  of age-earnings profiles, and this  issue is considered
next.
28  Lazear (1979) argues that this explains why employers impose mandatory retirement in defined-
benefit  schemes.  A  mix of  higher,  seniority pay  and  backloaded pension  benefits  mean  that  the
employer's costs of continuing to employ older workers exceed  productivity, meaning it is in their interest
for them to leave. See also Burkhauser  and Quinn (1983)  and Hutchens (1986).
20Figure 14. Defined-benefit  pensions
under  average  and final salary  formulae
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8.2.2  WhVal  do 'tne 'age-earningssprojiles  look like?
Simple  cross-section  analysis  of  age-earnings  profiles  generally  shows  an  inverted-U
shape,  xvith real  earnings  falling  at  older  ages.  Figure  15 shows  this  pattern  using  data  on  hourly
earnings  for  the  United  Kingdom. 29 Separate  wage  equations,  including  a quadratic  term  in  age,
were  estimated  for  each  occupational  group.
Figure 15. Age-earnings profiles by occupation, United Kingdom
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Source: Disney and Whitehouse (1991), Tables 2, 5 and 7
The  pay  of  professional,  and  to  a lesser  extent,  managenal  workers  rises  steeply  with  age
initially.  Professional  earnings  flatten  when  workers  reach  their  mid-50s,  with  a  rather  earlier
peak  for managers.  In  contrast,  the  profiles  for  manual  workers  are  much  flatter  and  peak  earlier,
in  the  early  to  mid-40s.  TI'he decline  in  earnings  after  their  peak  is also  relatively  larger,  so  that
29  Disnev  and  \Xhitehouse  (1991).  The  data  are  drawvn from  a pool  of  Family Expenditure  Sunrey
cross-sections  for 1978 to 1986.
21workers  from their late 50s onwards  earn  the same  or less  than workers  in their 20s. This shows
that both schemes  based  on both final  ad best earnings  are regressive.  Professional  workers  final
pay  is much higher  relative  to their  average  pay  than the same  ration of manual  workers.
Figure 16 shows a simple  measure  of the slope of age-earnings  profiles  for a range of
OECD countries:  the ratio of earnings  of 55-64  year  olds  to that of 45-54  year  olds. In Germany,
Italy  and Switzerland  the difference  is very small,  while  in France,  the oldest  workers  earn  more
than their irnmediate  juniors  do. At the other end of the spectrum,  wages  for the oldest  workers
in Australia,  Canada,  Mexico  and the United  Kingdom  are 17  per cent below  people  aged  45-54.
These economies  are conventionally  classified  as those with more flexible  labour  markets. The
decline in Japan, in contrast, reflects the lifetime  employment  system and the occupational
downgrading  of older workers within the economic  group to which their employer  belongs.
Interestingly,  the oldest  workers  in the United States  (the archetypal  flexible  labour  market)  earn
only 10  per cent less  than their.  juniors  do.
Figure 16. Relative  earnings  of older  workers
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Source:  OECD (1  998c)
However,  these cross-section  analyses  conflate  age and cohort effects. Lower  earnings  of
older  workers  in cross-section  also  reflect  cohort differences  in education,  training,  labour-market
experience  etc.  that cannot  be disentangled  from the pure age  effect.
Following  the same  cohort over time, other studies  have  found that age-earnings  profiles
are close  to linear,  with pay rising  even  at older ages.30  However,  earnings  are endogenous  to the
retirement  decision,  so there is a sample  selection  problem as the people  working  at older ages
are not representative  of the whole cohort.  Even cohort-based  studies  are therefore a biased
measure of age-earnings  profiles. Attempting  to control for this selection  raises  a problem of
simultaneity.  We can only  know  the true nature  of this selection  process  if we know  why  people
retire  early. And  we can only  know  why  people  retire  early  if we know  what true,  individual  age-
earnings  profiles  look like.
30  See,  for example,  Meghir  and  Whitehouse  (1996)  and  Gosing,  Machin  and  Meghir  (1998).  This
issue  is also  explored  in Freeman  (1979,  1989),  Berger  (1983),  Disney  (1996),  Chapter  6 and  Kotlikoff  and
Gokhale  (1992)
22Another important field of literature looks at the effect of job displacement on earnings.
This is particularly  relevant for the incentives of workers who leave their jobs involuntarily and so
face a choice of either retirement or starting a new job.  In the United States, for  example,
earnings of older workers who lose their job and start a new one are 39 per cent lower (for a
period of two years) than people who remain in their jobs. 3
8.2.3  Age-eamrvigs  p/es  xumd k irncnte
Age-earnings  profiles that are flatter or declining at older ages have a number of effects
on the measures of incentives compared with our baseline results.  First, the denominator of the
measures of incentives is lower because of lower pay, increasing replacement rates and effective
tax rates for both defined-contribution and defined-benefit schemes.  Secondly, the decline in
final salary at older ages means the relative effects of final- and average-earnings  defined-benefit
schemes is  reversed from  the  pattern  in  Figure  14.  Final-salary schemes will give higher
replacement rates at younger ages.  Overall, the effect of final pay formulae relative to average-
pay varies with the relationship between earnings and age.  Given the discussion of the previous
paragraph, this will be particularly relevant for people who leave a job involuntarily. Final-salary
systems will give a powerful disincentive  to take another job with lower pay. This, along with the
problems raised at the beginning of section 8.2, suggests that  defined-benefit schemes should
preferably be based on average-salary.
8.3  'Actuarial' adjustments  to defined-benefitpensions
Some countnres adjust defined-benefit pensions to  reflect the fact that they are drawn
either early or late.  Table 3 shows the size of these adjustments in the 32 countries that have
them.  It lists countries in inverse order of the size of the adjustment.
Actuarial adjustments are more common in OECD countries than outside: 14 out of the
total of 29 OECD members use them.  There is little difference between adjustments to early or
late pensions.  But there  is a big difference between OECD  and non-OECD  countries, with
averages  of 6½h  per cent in the former and a little under 3½h  per cent in the latter for each year the
pension is drawn early or late.
These adjustments apply over very different age ranges in different countries.  In  11,
actuarial changes cover only early pension claims (before the 'normal' pension  age).  In  many
countries, there is evidence that the majority draw their pension at this  'early' age, despite the
reduction in their pension benefit.  In 12 countries, increments are only given for deferring the
pension, while in six, increments are decrements are applied both to early and late pensions.
Notional-accounts pension systems also adjust the pension according to the age at which
it is drawn.  The implied adjustment will be 8-9 per cent a year in Poland and around 7 per cent
m Latvia."
31  Couch (1998).  See  also  Jacobson,  LaLonde  and Sullivan  (1993)  and Ruhm (1990).
32  Chlon,  Gora and Rutkowski  (1999)  on Poland  and Fox and Palmer  (1999)  on Latvia. See Disney
and Whitehouse  (1999b)  for a discussion  of retirement  incentives  in notional-accounts  systems.
23Table 3. 'Actuarial' adjustments in defined-benefit plans
Age adjustments  apply  Size  of adjustment
Japan  60-70  early & late  12
France??  60-70  late  10
Finland  60-70  early & late  6-12
Liechtenstein  65-70  late  8.4
Spain  60-65  early  8
United Kingdom  65-70  late  7.5
Sweden  60-70  early & late  6-8.4
United States  62-70  early & late  6-6.7
Canada  60-70  early  6
Dominica  60-  late  6
Germany  63-67  early & late  6
Greece  60-65  early  6
Pakistan  55-60  early  6
C6te d'lvoire  50-55  early  5
Guinea  55-  late  5
Israel  65-70  late  5
Mali  50-55  early  5
Mexico  60-65  early  5
Senegal  53-55  early  5
Albania  60-  late  4
Czech Republic  60-70  late  4
Cuba  60-65  late  1.5-4
Italy  57-65  early & late  3.5
El Salvador  60-  late  3
Honduras  65-  late  3
Hungary  60-70  late  3
Panama  62-  late  2
Sudan  45-60  early  1.2-1.9
Costa Rica  62-65  late  1.5
Croatia  -60  early  1.33
Algeria  -60  early  1
Nicaragua  60-65  late  1
Turkey  55-  late  1
Note:  Australia  is considering  introducing  a deferred  retirement  bonus  plan for men  working  from age 65 to 70
(and 61-66  for women). Ages where  adjustments  apply  are for men where  these  differ  from women. Costa Rica
gives 1.5  per  cent for first year  of deferral,  2 per  cent  for second  year  and 2.5 per  cent for the third. In Croatia,  the
reductions  only apply  for pensions  up to normal  retirement  age (60). New  system  for Italy  applies  to contributions
since December  1995.  Early pensions  in Mexico  only available  if the individual  is involuntarily  unemployed.
Adjustment  is based  on age coefficient  of 4.72  at age 57 and  6.136 at age 65. Sweden  is planning  to remove  the
upper age limit for deferral  in 1999. The 6 per cent rate applies before  65, 8.4 per cent after 65.  The United
Kingdom  will increase  the deferral  rate  to 10 per cent after  2010  and remove  the age 70 ceiling  for deferral. The
United States will increase its rate to 8 per cent by 2001: see section 8.4.3 below. The Hungarian reform
introduced  a penalty  for retirement  below  age 62 equivalent  to 3.6%  per annum  in the long run. The Polish  reform
introduces  an increment  for delayed  retirement  equivalent  based  on the notional  interest  rate and higher  annuity
level  through  the new  system  of notional  accounts  for contributors  aged  50 or under  in 1999.
Source:  Department  of Health and Human Services  (1997), Kalisch and Aman (1998); Palacios and Rocha
(1999);  Chlon,  Gora  and Rutkowski  (1999).
248.3. 1  A cuarzid  nmral  adusnerts
How do these adjustments compare with the actuarially  neutral increment or decrement?
We define the actuarially  neutral increment or decrement as the change that would keep the net
present value of the pension constant.  This has three elements. First, the change in the annuity
rate between the two relevant ages captures the effect of the one-year delay in claiming the
pension.  Secondly,  account must also be taken of the risk of dying during the year. Thirdly, the
net value of the delayed pension must be discounted back to the present.
Figure 17 shows the results for Thai mortality data.  The rate increases with age because
of the increase in mortality and because, at older ages, one year's delay is a larger proportion of
the total expected duration of pension payment.  For men, the rate increases from 7 per cent at
age 50 to  12 per cent at age 70.  For women, the rate will be hig} -r because of their longer life
expectancy.
Comparing Figure 17 with the rates in Table 3 shows that the average adjustment is
below the actuarially  neutral level in most countries, with the (probable 33)  exceptions of Japan,
Finland Liechtenstein  Spain,  the United Kingdom and Sweden. 34
Figure 17.  Neutral actuarial adjustment to
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8.3.2  The  impaaonuork xues
Figure 18 examines the effect of actuarial adjustments on work incentives.  We have
assumed a 5 per cent change  in the pension for each year  the pension is drawn before or after age
65, which is approximately  the average adjustment in Table 3.
The  adjusted replacement  rate  for  the  defined-benefit  scheme  now  has  a  more
pronounced upward slope, but not as strong as the defined-contribution plan.
We  do not have  life  tables  for all  these  countries  to be able  accurately  to assess  this claim.
34  Studies  have also  found  that  private  plans  tend  to  have  less than  fair actuarial  decerements  for
early retirement.  See, for example,  Kotlikoff  and Smnith  (1983) and  the  discussions in Quinn,  Burkhauser
and Myers (1990) and  Kotlikoff and Wise (1985).
25Figure 18.  Impact of actuarial adjustments
in defined-benefit schemes on replacement rates
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8.4  Earning  while  drawingpension
Our basic model of retirement  incentives  assumed  that people  had to give up  work when
they claimed their pension.  In many countries,  working  while drawing  pension  is possible.  This
complicates  the  analysis of pension  plans  and retirement  incentives  enormously,  as most  models
can only be identified by equating  the point  of retirement  (i.e.  withdrawing  from  the labour  force)
15 with the point  of first drawing  the pension.
Table  4  shows  the  position  in  OECD  countries.  Again,  policies  differ.  In  Ireland,
Portugal  and  Spain,  the pension  is paid  conditional  on  withdrawal  from  paid  work.  People  in
France  must retire definitively from their usual job, although  it is possible to take another  job.
In  the  majority  of  countries,  however,  a  limited  amount  of  work  is  compatible  with
drawing  the pension.  Canada  has the most  liberal of these  regimes.  People  can earn  up to  160
per cent of average earnings with full pension,  and  then  the pension  is withdrawn  at  15 cents  for
each dollar of earnings above  that  point.  In Greece,  pensioners  may earn  up  to  116 per  cent  of
average earnings, but then the whole pension  is withdrawn.
Italy, Japan  and  the United  States also have earnings  limits.  In Japan,  for example,  20 per
cent  of  the  pension  is withdrawn  when  earnings  are  between  17  and  90  per  cent  of  average
earnings.  Above  90 per  cent of average earnings,  the whole  pension  is withdrawn.  However,  in
both  these  countries,  deferral is possible,  allowing people  to get round  the  effect  of the earnings
test.  (Section 8.4.3 below discusses the United  States' system in more  detail.)
At  the  foot  of  the  Table  are  eight  countries  that  irnpose  little  or  no  restrictions  on
combining work with pension payments.
55  Sec in/eralia  Gustman and Steinmeier  (1984).
26Table  4.  Earning while drawing pension, OECD  countries
Disregard  Withdrawal  rate (%)
(% of average  earnings)
Deferral  not possible
Canada  160  15
Greece  116  full
Iceland  59  25
Denmark  50  60
Austria  30  full
Belgium  33  100
Norway  18  50
Australia  8  50
France  none  full
Ireland  none  full
Portugal  none  full
Spain  none  full
Deferral  possible
Italy  23  100
Japan  17-90  20
90  full










Note:  Pension in  Ireland, Portugal and Spain conditional on withdrawal from work.  Pension
withdrawn  at a 100 per cent rate between  29 and 33 per cent of average  earnings  in Belgium. Italy
gives a  higher disregard for self-employment  incomes (which are an important income source).
Australia has a  means-tested  system and  all income sources (including private pensions) are
withdrawn  against  the public pension.  Portugal  has recently  allowed people to work and claim full
pension  (Kalisch  and Aman, 1999,  Table 16). The United  States  has a lower  disregard  (18 per  cent of
average  earnings)  for people  aged 62-64;  Poland  refers  to reformed  system.
Source:  Blondal  and Scarpetta (1998), based on Department  of Health and Human  Services  (1997),
European  Commission  (1996) and OECD (1996b); Kalisch and Aman (1998);  Chlon, Gora and
Rutkowski  (1999).
8.4.1  Patial reaertproga=s
A small number of countries have partial or phased retirement schemes. 36 These allow
people to cut their hours of work while claiming  part of their pension.  In Denmark, people who
reduce their working hours between age 60 and the normal pensionable age of 67 can receive  part
36  See Casey (1998), Laczko (1988) and  Naegele (1996) for  a  discussion of gradual retirement
schemes. Gustman and Steinmeier  (1984)  and Ruhm (1990)  discuss 'bridge'  jobs as a route to partial
retirement in the United States.
27of their  pension. 37 People  must have  been employed  full-time  for 10  of the previous  20 years  and
cut their hours to between 12 and 30 per week. Germany  reimburses  employers  the cost of
paying  a 20-per-cent  earnings  supplement  and maintaining  90 per cent of previous pension
contributions  to people  who reduce  their hours by half or more. Luxembourg  allows  people  to
combine  half of their earnings  with a one-half pension. Japan pays lower pensions  to people
aged  between 60 and 64 if they reduce  work attachment. If the combined  pension and lower
wage  is below $24 000 the pension  is cut by 20 per cent.  Between  $24 000 and $36 000,  the
pension is reduced at a marginal  rate of 50 per cent, with 100 per cent withdrawal  against
earnings  over $36  000. Canada  is also  considering  a partial  retirement  scheme.
Partial  retirement  programmes  are attractive  in theory. They might encourage  people  to
remain in work longer than they would given a binary choice between full-time  work or
retirement  (although  they  might  reduce  the labour supply  of some  workers  who otherwise  would
have remained  in full-time  work).  In particular,  they might allow any age-related  decline  in
stamina or  capabilties  to  be accommodated. In practice, however, the  take-up of  partial
retirement  schemes  has been very limited. In Gernany, for exarnple,  only 2,000  of an elgible
population  of 1.2  million  availed  themselves  of this option.
In some countries,  such as France and Germany,  early  retirement  (on only marginally
lower  incomes)  proved more attractive  than partial retirement. In Germany and the United
Kingdom, employer-run  defined-benefit  programmes dependent on  final pay were not co-
ordinated  with the public  programme,  so gradual  retirement  would  resuk in a much lower  private
pension.  Many employers  were also unable or reluctant  to  re-organise  work around partial
retirees.
8.4.2  Canhnviguork  x ndpiw2.:  refn  in the  UnaJKinglorm
The United Kingdom used to  have an earnings limit of around a third of average
earnings. Above  this level,  the pension  was withdrawn,  at 50 per cent over a short range and
then at 100 per cent.  However,  most people who were working  and earning  above the limit
deferred  their pension,  earning  increments  in their eventual  pension  of 71/2  per cent per year of
deferral  gIable 3).  Only 2,500 people had their pension capped by the earnings test while
200,000  deferred. A further 200,000  were claiming  the pension  and working,  but did not have
their pension  reduced  because  they were below the limit. The rule could have affected  them if
they  would  have  chosen  to work more  in the absence  of the earnings  test.
The United  Kingdom  abolished  the earnings  rule in 1989. The effects  of this policy  are
complex. 38 For those who are currently  working and either deferring  their pension or have
deferred,  the change  is a pure income effect, suggesting  reduced  labour-supply  incentives. For
people not working or earning below the earnings  lirnit, there will be a positive substitution
effect. Both are likely  to be small. The fiscal effect  of abolition  will also be tiny.  Since  the
actuarial  adjustments  for deferrals  are fairly  close  to neutral  on average,  there will be an up-front
cost as  people  claim  their  pension  earlier,  with a saving  on the adjustments  in the future.
Current regulations  require  members  of employer-provided  schemes  to retire  fully  from
their  job before  they can draw  their pension. People  could draw  their occupational  pension  and
Ministry  of  Social  Affairs  (1995).
See  VAhitehouse  (1990)  for a detailed  analysis.
28work, but would have to take a different job.  The government  last year 9 proposed a more
flexible  regime,  including  the possibility  of partial  retirement. People  will be able to draw their
occupational  pension at any age between 50 and 75 irrespective  of whether  they actually  retire.
People  will be able to draw the benefits  from additional  voluntary  contributions  into employer
schemes  at any age between 50 and 75, irrespective  of when the main occupational  pension  is
drawn. These  two reforms  are designed  to allow  a more flexible  transition  from full-time  work to
retirement  - as in the partial  retirement  programmes  described  in the previous  section  - rather
than the current  'all-or-nothing'  choice.
8.4.3  Cxmbiguwrk  dpss:  refms md2ie  UnitedStates
The United States has also altered  the rules for earning  while drawing  social security. 40
The original  test, introduced  in the 1930s,  took away  the whole  pension  once  earnings  exceeded  a
fifth of average  earnings. There has been a gradual  liberalisation  in the rules. First,  the exempt
amount was increased  periodically  during the 1960s and then indexed  to inflation  from 1972.
Each year  from 1978  to 1982,  there were above-inflation  increases.  The limit  for 65-69  year olds
will increase  from $12,500  to $30,000 between 1996 and 2002.  Secondly,  there have been
reductions  in the withdrawal  rate. In 1960,  a schedule  of 50 and 100  per cent withdrawal  rates
replaced  the immediate  loss of all  benefits  one the limit  was reached. The 100  per cent band was
abolished  in  1972. The withdrawal  rate for 65-69 year olds was cut to 33 per cent in 1990.
Finally,  the earnings  test was abolished  completely  for people aged  72 and over in 1954  and for
70 and 71  year  olds in 1983.
The eventual  pension  is higher  to reflect  benefits  withdrawn  under  the earnings  test, as in
the deferral  system  in the United  Kingdom. This increase,  called  the delayed  retirement  credit,
was introduced  in 1973  at a rate of 1 per cent for each year of deferral  between  64 and 69. In
1982,  it was increased  to 3 per cent. Since  1990,  it has increased  at half a percentage  point a year,
and will continue until it reaches  8 per cent.  When it reaches  this final target  level,  it will be
approximately  actuarially  neutral.
In 1989,  27 per cent of Americans  aged  65-69  were working. Of these, 38 per cent had
some benefits  withdrawn  under the earnings  test and 29 per cent were  working  and not claiming
pension benefits. 4'  Further evidence  of the impact of the earnings  test is that 9 per cent had
earnings  very  close  to the earnings-test  limit.
Most empirical  studies of the  earnings  test's effect on labour supply have found it
unimportant. 42 More recent analysis,  however,  is able to use the 'natural  experiment'  of changes
to the earnings  test that affect different age groups in different  ways  to obtain more accurate
estimates  of its effect. Friedberg  (1998a)  finds  that eliminating  the test would  increase  aggregate
hours worked of those currently  affected  by the rule by 5.3 per cent (taking  account of the
decline  in hours of those with  the highest  earnings  from the income  effect). Her study,  however,
treats  the earnings  test as a pure tax, despite  the eventual  increase  in the pension  benefit  when it
39  Department  of Social  Security  (1998).
40  See  Friedberg  (1998).
41  Bondar  (1993).
42  See  inter  aliza,  Bondar  (1993),  Honig  and  Reimers  (1989),  Leonesio  (1990,  1993),  Packard  (1990).
Robbins  and  Robbins  (1989)  found  a substantial  effect,  but Leonesio  (1990)  dismnisses  this  work  as  having
'serious  theoretical  and  methodological  shortcomings'.
29is finally claimed. 43 She gives four reasons for this treatment.  First, people are aware of the
earnings test - 73 per cent of pensioners under age 72 told the New Benficiary  Surrey  of 1982  that
they knew of it44 - but are not  aware of the  link between the test and subsequent pension
credits.  She cites newspaper and financial  magazine descriptions of the earnings test that ignore
the credits. 45 Secondly,  people are myopic or, thirdly, face borrowing constraints and so under-
value the increase in future income.  Finally, the current credits are below the actuarially  neutral
level, especially for  men  and  those  with  short  life expectancy.  However, these  last three
arguments suggest  that only part of the earnings  test reduction is a tax.
8.4.4  am(  ninguzrk adp  si.ispo  icyaindsio
Our discussion of the United Kingdom and the United States shows that earnings tests
have extremely complex interactions with rules for actuarial  adjustments.
There is a sizeable dead-weight cost to  abolishing earnings tests,  as people draw the
pension at the earliest possible age and continue to  work as before.  Poland, for example, has
introduced an earnings test in its recent reform.  The aim is to prevent people, particularly in
occupations with special early retirement provisions, from drawing pension and continuing to
work. 46 The government expects this to cut spending by 0.3 per cent of GDP in 2003, around 15
per  cent of the total  reduction in spending anticipated from  the recent reform.  The Slovak
Republic has drafted similar legislation  to prevent people combining work and pensions.  Italy is
also moving to limit these opportunities.
9.  Conclusions,  policy implications  and future developments
We have presented  a  simple model  of  how  different  types of  pension  plan affect
retirement incentives. The results show a powerful incentive to leave work at the earliest possible
age in defined-benefit plans. Defined-contribution plans, in contrast, encourage people to remain
in work longer.
Examining 'real-world' defined-benefit schemes, we  found  many  have features that
provide more profound disincentives  to work, such as
*  early retirement programmes that enable people to leave work with no reduction in pension
or a decrement that is less than actuarially  fair
a  non-linear accrual structures or  maximum pensions that  give a low or  zero increment to
pension for working at older ages
43  There is some empirical  evidence  to  support this claim.  Reimers and Honig (1993, 1996)
compare  the response  of labour-market  re-entry  behaviour  of men before  and after age  65 to changes  in
the earnings  limit. These are expected  to differ, because  of the variance  in the actuarial  adjustments.
However,  they found  very  similar  effects  for both age  groups. Friedberg  could  not find an effect from  the
credit  when she  included  this in the modelling.
44  Leonesio  (1990).
45  Simon (1996)  and Kristhof  (1997).
46  See  Gora and Rutkowski  (1998).
30*  final-salary  formulae  that encourage  people to  leave  the labour force once earnings  reach
their peak
*  pension systems  that still levy employer  and/or  employee  contributions  even when no
additional  pension  is earned
*  earnings  tests that prevent  people from combining  work and pensions  and do not actuarially
fair  increments  for defernrng  a pension  claim
9.1  Policy implications
Addressing  these problems  should be a central  part of any pension reform, and these
reforms  should  be informed,  at  the minimum,  by  the types  of analysis  we have  carried  out here.
The problems  in existing  public pensions  we outlined previously  suggest  a number of
useful  reforms. First early  retirement  schemes  should be curtailed. This might involve  moving
towards  actuarial  reductions  in early-retirement  pensions,  increases  in the age at which they can
be claimed  or tighter  conditions  for entitlement,  such as duration of employment  or participation
in training  programmes. We recognise  that many of these schemes  were a response  to genuine
labour-market  problems  faced  by older  workers. However,  problems  such as age discrimination"
and  the lack  of appropriate  skills  are best addressed  directly.
Secondly,  many of the distortions  to labour-supply  incentives  caused  by defined-benefit
pensions  could be mitigated  by moving  to pensions  based  on average  salary  across  the working
life rather than a limited  number of best or final  years. Maximum  pensions and limits  to the
number of years of contributions  that earn pensions should be removed to  give people an
incentive  to work beyond these limits. Contributions  should not be levied at ages or in years
when  people  do not earn  a pension  entitlement.
Thirdly,  while  early-retirement  schemes  do need  to enforce earnings  tests to avoid  abuse,
it should  be possible  to allow  people  to combine  pensions  at the standard  age with some  work.
Alternatively,  people  should  be able  defer  drawing  their pension  at actuarially  fair rates.
We briefly  considered  partial retirement  schemes. These might encourage  people who
would  otherwise  leave  the workforce  retire gradually,  by moving  to part-time  work. However,
these programnes have rarely been taken up  by a  significant  proportion of  the  eligible
population.  There are reasonable  explanations  for this failure, which suggests that partial
retirement  is unlikely  to be much  of a panacea.
9.2  Recent policy initiatives in OECD countnies
We noted in the introduction  that more than half of OECD countries  mentioned  low
effective  retirement  ages and poor work incentives  in the pension  system as a matter of policy
concern.  Only  problems with  the  financial viability, mentioned by  three-quarters of
governrnents,  were  the subject  of more  widespread  worry.
Table 5 shows  that more than 80 per cent of OECD countries  have recently  introduced
reforms  designed  to promote  the employment  of older  workers. Nine countries  will increase  the
standard  age for state pensions  by an average  of three years. In addition,  Australia  will  raise  the
47  See,  inter  alia,  Hutchens  (1986,  1988),  Hutchens  (1986,  1988),  Johnson  and Neumark  (1996),
Neumark  and  Stock  (1997),  OECD  (1998c).
31age at which people  can draw  private  pensions. Eight other countries  will increase  the age at
which women can draw pensions. In seven,  this will equalise  women's  pensionable  age with
men's. The average  increase  is over four  years.
In practice,  most people  retire  well  before the standard  pension  age in the vast majority
of countries. The effective  retirement  age is on average  five years  younger  than the 'normal'
retirement  age. Twelve  countries  are therefore aiming  to restrict  eligibility  for early retirement,
which may be a more potent policy  for raising  effective  retirement  ages than changing  the
standard  pension  age. Belgium,  France,  Greece,  Hungary,  Italy and Portugal  will increase  the
number  of contribution  years  required  to qualify  for a pension. Finland,  Germany,  Hungary,
Italy  and Poland  will  increase  the minimum  age to qualify  for pensions. Denmark  requires  local
authorities  to  offer training and labour-market  re-integration  programmes  before an early
retirement  pension  can be granted. Finally,  five countries  will introduce or have proposed
schemes  to encourage  people  to work after normal  pension  age,  as discussed  above in sections
8.3 and 8.4.
9.3  Future  developments
The model  we have  developed  is a useful  tool for examnining  the financial  rewards  to
working  that generates  a number  of practical  policy  conclusions. 48 However,  it is at the moment
simplistic  and, although  we have  examined  a number of features  of different  countries'  pension
systems,  we have not studied any of these programmes  as a whole.  Our future work on
retirement  therefore  has two main aims.  First, to explore how.  the incentives  generated  by
pension  schemes  affect  labour-supply  behaviour. Secondly,  to assess  the impact  on incentives  of
a number of countnres'  pension systems  and how they might be reformed  to  reduce  labour-
market  distortions  and  promote  work.
48  We  will  provide  the model,  implemented  in the  Stata  statistics  and  data  programning  language,  on
request.
32Table 5. Recent  policy  initiatives  to promote  employment  of older  workers
Increase  in  pension  age  Equalising  pension  age  Discouraging  early  Encouraging  work  after
retirement  pension  age
Australia:  from  55  to  60  in  Australia:  to  65  (by  2013)  Austria:  reduced  access  Australia:  deferred  pension
age  for  private  pensions  (by  bonus  plan  proposed  (men
2025)  65-70  and  women  61-66)
Czech  Republic:  from  60  to  Belgium:  to  65  (by  2009)  Belgium:  contribution  years  Norway:  smaller  reduction
62  for  men  and  53-57  to  57-  for  retirement  at  60  from  20  for  working  while  drawing
61  for  women  (by  2007)  to  35  (by  2005)  pension  for  ages  67-70
Finland:  from  63  to  65  Germany:  from  60  to  65  (by  Denmark:  local  authorities  Sweden:  allow  actuarial
2004)  to  provide  training  etc.  increases  for  deferral  after
before  pension  can  be  age  70
Hungary:  to  62  for  men  (by  Greece:  from  60  to  65  (post- MS&hd:  lower  benefit  and  United  Kingdom:  increased
2001)  and  for  women  (by  1993  labour-market  minimum  age  from  55  to  58  deferral  increment;  increm-
2009)  entrants)  ents  for  deferral  after  age  70
Italy:  from  63  to  65  for  men  Poland:  from  60  to  65  to  France:  contribution  years  United  States:  higher
and  58  to  60  for  women  (by  equalise  with  men  from  371/%  to  40  earnings  limit;  increased
2000);  57-65  in  new  scheme  deferral  increment
Japan:  from  60  to  65  for  Portugal:  to  65  (by  1999)  Gernany:  minimum  age  to
men  (by  20013);  from  59  to  62  (from  2012)
65  for  women  (by  2018)
Korea:  from  60  to  65  (by  Switzerland:  from  62  to  64  Greece:  minimum
2033)  (by  2005),  remains  below  contribution  years  from  13%2
men's  age  of  65  to  15
New  Zealand:  from  62  to  65  United  Kingdom:  from  60  Hungary:  higher  age  and
(by  2001)  to  65  (by  2020)  contribution  years
Spain:  from  60  to  65  Ireland:  special  scheme  for
(people  entering  the  labour  civil  servants  ceased
market  after  1967)
United  States:  from  65  to  Italy:  minimum  age  52  (from
67  (by  2027)  1997);  contribution  years
increased  from  35  to  40
years  (from  2008)
Poland:  increase  in
minimum  age  from  60  to  62
planned
Portugal:  increase  in
minimum  contribution  years
from  10  to  15
Source:  Kalisch  and  Aman (1998),  OECD (1997b)
33Annex 1. Accrual rates by years of contributions
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